A (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor is a function nmExt : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} d → {0, 1} that takes two inputs, a weak source X ∼ {0, 1}
Introduction
Randomness extractors are central objects in the theory of computation. Loosely speaking, a seeded extractor [NZ96] is a randomized algorithm that extracts nearly uniform bits from biased random sources, using a short seed of randomness. A non-malleable extractor [DW09] is a seeded extractor that satisfies a very strong requirement regarding the lack of correlations of the output of the extractor with respect to different seeds.
More accurately, a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor is a function nmExt : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} d → {0, 1} such that for every (weak) source X of min-entropy k and a random variable s uniformly distributed on {0, 1} d it holds that nmExt(X, s) is ε-close to uniform, even given the seed s ∈ {0, 1} d and the value nmExt(X, s ) for any seed s = s that is determined as an arbitrary function of s. More generally, if nmExt(X, s) is ε-close to uniform, even given nmExt(X, s 1 ), . . . , nmExt(X, s t ) for t adversarially chosen seeds such that s i = s for all i ∈ [t], we say it is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor [CRS14] .
The notion of non-malleable extractors is strongly motivated by applications to privacy amplification protocols, as well as proven to be a fundamental notion in the theory of pseudorandomness, as has been recently exemplified by the key role it played in the breakthrough construction of explicit two-source extractors by Chattopadhyay and Zuckerman [CZ16] . Moreover, it also has an important connection to Ramsey theory [BKS + 05].
Non-malleable extractors can be thought of as a strengthening of the notion of strong seeded extractors. These are functions Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} such that for a weak source X and seed s it holds that Ext(X, s) is ε-close to uniform, even given the seed s ∈ {0, 1} d . We stress that this is a much weaker guarantee than that of non-malleable extractors. In particular, there exist a blackbox transformation of seeded extractors into strong seeded extractors with roughly the same parameters [RSW06] , whereas no such transformation is known for non-malleable extractors.
By a simple probabilistic argument (see, e.g., [Vad12] ), there exists a (strong) seeded extractor Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} for sources of seed length d = log(n) + 2 log(1/ε) + O(1) and minentropy k = 2 log(1/ε) + O(1). Moreover, by a long line of research, starting with the seminal work of Nisan and Zuckerman [NZ96] , and culminating with [GUV09, DKSS13, TU12] we now know of explicit constructions that nearly achieve the optimal parameters.
For non-malleable extractors the parameters achievable by current constructions are weaker. Dodis and Wichs showed the existence of (k, ε)-non-malleable extractors with seed length d = log(n − k − 1) + 2 log(1/ε) + 6, and entropy k > log(d) + 2 log(1/ε) + 8; and in particular, for k ≥ log log(n) + 2 log(1/ε). The best explicit construction, due to [Coh17] achieve seed length
Note that while for (strong) seeded extractors there are constructions that support sources of entropy k = 2 log(1/ε) + O(1), without any dependence on n, all known constructions of nonmalleable extractors require the entropy of the source to be at least doubly-logarithmic in n. This naturally raises the question of whether the dependence on n is indeed necessary for non-malleable extractors.
Question: Is it true that in any (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor the entropy k must grow with n?
In this paper we give a positive answer to this question, as well as reveal a simple yet fundamental connection between non-malleable extractors and error-correcting codes, which we believe to be of independent interest.
Our results
Our main result is a lower bound on the entropy required by non-malleable extractors, which essentially matches the one obtained by the probabilistic construction. In particular, we show that any (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor requires the source entropy k to be at least log log(n) − (2 − o ε (1)) log(1/ε). In fact, we prove the entropy lower bound for the more general notion of t-non-malleable extractors.
Theorem 1 (Main result). Let n, k, d, t ∈ N be parameters such that t ≤ 2 d/2 , and let ε ∈ (0, c 0 ) for some absolute constant c 0 . If nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor, then d > log(n − k) + 2 log(1/ε) − C and k ≥ log(d) + 2 log(1/ε) − log log(1/ε) + log(t) − C for an absolute constant C.
We remark that by a recent result of Ben-Aroya et al. [BCD + 17] (see Theorem 2.4), the lower bound on d in the theorem is tight up to an additive factor of O(log(t)), and our lower bound on k is almost tight in ε, up to an additive factor of log log(1/ε). Furthermore, since as we mentioned above, there exist (strong) seeded extractors for sources of entropy k = 2 log(1/ε)+O(1), Theorem 1 implies a chasm between non-malleable extractors and (strong) seeded extractors; in particular, it rules out the possibility of transforming seeded extractors into non-malleable extractors, while preserving the parameters.
A key technical tool that we use to prove Theorem 1 is a lemma, which shows that any nonmalleable extractor induces an error correcting code with a good distance. We believe this lemma is of independent interest. Lemma 2. If there exists a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1}, then there exists an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1} 2 k with relative distance 0.5 − 2ε and rate
In fact, we actually prove a more general lemma, which shows that t-non-malleable extractors induce codes with rate that grows with t. See Section 4 for details.
Technical overview
We provide a high-level overview of the proof of our main result, the entropy lower bound in Theorem 1, for the simple case of t = 1 (i.e., for standard non-malleable extractors). See Section 4 for the complete details of the proof for the general case. We assume basic familiarity with coding theory and extractors (see Section 2 for the necessary preliminaries).
Consider a non-malleable extractor nmExt. Our strategy for showing a lower bound on the source entropy of nmExt consists of the following two steps.
1. Derive a binary code C with high distance and rate from nmExt, as captured by Lemma 2.
2. Show refined bounds on the rate of binary codes with a given minimum distance, and apply them to C to obtain an entropy lower bound.
That is, we show that if the parameters of nmExt were too good, then the implied code C would have parameters that would violate the rate bounds in the second step. Below, we elaborate on each of the steps.
Deriving codes from non-malleable extractors. We start with a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1}. Denote K = 2 k , and consider a (flat) source X, which we view as a collection of K vectors X ⊆ {0, 1} n . We show that there is a large subset S of the seeds such that the evaluations of nmExt, with respect to X and S, constitute a code with high distance and rate. More accurately, denote by w (s) the evaluation vector of nmExt on the source X and seed s ∈ {0, 1} d ; that is, w (s) = (nmExt(x, s)) x∈X . We show that there exists a large subset of seeds S ⊆ {0, 1} d such that
is a code with distance 0.5 − 2ε and rate (d − 1)/K. As a warmup, it is instructive to note that the definition of (standard) seeded extractors only requires that a random coordinate of a random w (s) is nearly uniformly distributed. Strong seeded extractors also imply that most evaluation vectors are roughly balanced (i.e., contain a similar number of zeros and ones), 1 as a strong seeded extractor needs to output a nearly uniform bit, even given the seed (i.e., even when the identity of w (s) is known).
The key observation is that the structure of non-malleable extractors asserts that there exists a large subset of seeds whose corresponding evaluation vectors are (close to) pairwise uncorrelated, and hence constitute a code with large distance. Details follow.
Denote the number of seeds by D = 2 d . We wish to show that there exists a subset S ⊂ {0, 1} d of D/2 seeds whose corresponding evaluation vectors are pairwise (0.5 − 2ε)-far. Suppose the contrary, i.e., that every set S of D/2 seeds contains at least two distinct seeds s, s such that w (s) is (0.5 − 2ε)-close to w (s ) . This means that we can iteratively select a set of D/2 "bad" seeds The crux is that having many pairs of correlated evaluation vectors violates the assumption that nmExt is a non-malleable extractor. Intuitively, this holds because for each w (s i ) corresponding to a bad seed s i ∈ B, the output of nmExt(X, s i ) is biased given nmExt(X, s i ). Hence, a non-malleable extractor cannot have a large set of bad seeds.
In Section 4.1 we make this intuition precise by exhibiting an adversarial function A : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} d (with no fixed points) that matches pairs of bad seeds such that we can construct a distinguisher that, for a random variable U d uniformly distributed on the seeds {0, 1} d , can tell apart with confidence ε between nmExt(X, U d ) and a uniform bit, even when given nmExt(X, A(U d )) and U d .
Refined rate bounds for binary codes. After we derived a binary code C with distance 0.5−2ε and rate (d − 1)/K from a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor nmExt, we wish to apply upper bounds on the rate of binary codes, which will in turn imply entropy lower bounds on the entropy that nmExt requires.
Our starting point is the state-of-the-art upper bound of McEliece, Rodemich, Rumsey and Welch [MRR + 77], which, loosely speaking, states that any binary code with relative distance 0.5−ε has rate O(ε 2 log(1/ε)) for all sufficiently small ε > 0.
Alas, the aforementioned bound does not suffice for the entropy lower bound, as we need a quantitative bound in terms of the blocklength of the code. We, thus, prove the following theorem, which provides the refined bound that we need.
Theorem 3. Fix a constant c ∈ (0, 1/20), and let ε ∈ (0, c). For K > c ε 2 let C ⊆ {0, 1} K be a code with relative distance δ = 0.5 − ε. Then |C| < 2 23 c ε 2 log(1/ε)K .
We prove Theorem 3 in Section 3, relying on the spectral approach of Navon and Samorodnitsky [NS09] .
To conclude the proof of the entropy lower bound, we argue that if the non-malleable extractor nmExt could support entropy that is smaller than stated in Theorem 1, then the code C we derive via Lemma 2 would have rate that would violate the lower bound in Theorem 3.
Organization
In Section 2 we present the required preliminaries. In Section 3 we prove the refined bounds on the rate of binary codes. Finally, in Section 4 we prove our main result, Theorem 1, as well as Lemma 2, which captures the connection between non-malleable extractors and error correcting codes.
Preliminaries
We cover the notation and basic definitions used in this paper.
Notation
For n ∈ N, we denote by [n] the set {1, . . . , n}, and by U n the random variable that is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} n . Throughout, log(x) is defined as log 2 (x). The binary entropy function
. We denote by 1 E the indicator of an event E. For a finite set X, we denote by Pr x∈X [·] the probability over an element x that is chosen uniformly at random from X.
Distance. The relative Hamming distance (or just distance), over alphabet Σ, between two vec-
we say that x is ε-close to y, and otherwise we say that x is ε-far from y. Similarly, the relative distance of x ∈ Σ n from a non-empty set S ⊆ Σ n is denoted dist(x, S) def = min y∈S dist(x, y). If dist(x, S) ≤ ε, we say that x is ε-close to S, and otherwise we say that x is ε-far from S.
The total variation distance between two random variables X 1 , X 2 over domain Ω is denoted by
, and is equivalent, up to a factor 2, to their
We say that X 1 is ε-close to X 2 if dist TV (X 1 , X 2 ) ≤ ε, and otherwise we say that X 1 is ε-far from X 2 . Remark. In order to show that X 1 is ε-far from X 2 it suffices to show a randomized distinguisher
where the probabilities are over the random variables X 1 , X 2 and the randomness of D. Note that if such randomized distinguisher exists, then, by averaging, there is also a deterministic distinguisher with the same property. This, naturally, defines the event
Error correcting codes
Let k, n ∈ N, and let Σ be a finite alphabet. An error correcting code is a set C ⊆ Σ n , and the elements of C are called its codewords. The parameter n is called the blocklength of C, and k = log |Σ| (|C|) is the dimension of C. The relative distance of a code C is the minimal relative Hamming distance between its codewords, and is denoted by δ = min c =c ∈C {dist(c, c )}. The rate of the code, measuring the redundancy of the encoding, is the ratio of its dimension and blocklength, and is denote by ρ = k/n. If the alphabet is binary, i.e., Σ = {0, 1}, we say that C is a binary code.
Randomness extractors
We recall the standard definitions of random sources and several types of extractors, as well as state known bounds that we will need.
Weak sources. For integers n > k, an (n, k)-random source X of min-entropy k is a random variable taking values in {0, 1} n such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} n is holds that Pr[X = x] ≤ 2 −k . An (n, k)-random source X is flat if it is uniformly distributed over some subset S ⊆ {0, 1} n of size 2 k .
It is well known [CG88] that the distribution of any (n, k)-random source is a convex combination of distributions of flat (n, k)-random sources, and thus it typically suffices to consider flat sources. We follow the literature, restrict our attention to flat (n, k)-random sources, and refer to them simply as (n, k)-sources.
Seeded extractors. A function Ext
We will need the following lower bound on the source entropy required by strong seeded extractors, due to Radhakrishnan and Ta-Shma [RT00] (see also [NZ96] ).
Theorem 2.1 ([RT00] Theorem 1.9). Let Ext : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-strong seeded extractor. Then, it holds that d > log(n − k) + 2 log(1/ε) − c and k ≥ 2 log(1/ε) − c, for some absolute constant c ∈ R.
Non-malleable extractors. Informally, a non-malleable extractor nmExt is a seeded extractor that for any source X and seed s outputs a bit nmExt(X, s) that is nearly uniform even if given the seed s and value nmExt(X, s ) for an adversarially selected seed s .
Formally, we say that a function A : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} d is an adversarial function if it has no fixed points, i.e., if A(s) = s for all s ∈ {0, 1} d . Non-malleable extractors are defined as follows. 1} is a (k, ε) -non-malleable extractor if for any (n, k)-source X, and for any adversarial function A : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} d , it holds that the distribution of the 3-tuple (nmExt(X,
We will also consider the more general notion of t-non-malleable extractors, in which it is possible to extract randomness even given multiple (namely, t) outputs of the extractor with respect to adversarially chosen seeds. Definition 2.3. A function nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor if for any (n, k)-source X and for any t adversarial functions A 1 , . . . ,
We conclude this section by stating a recent result, due to Ben-Aroya et al. [BCD + 17], extending a result by Dodis and Wichs [DW09] , which complements our Theorem 1 by showing that the lower bound on the seed length d in the Theorem 1 is tight up to an additive factor of O(log(t)), and the lower bound on k is almost tight in ε, up to an additive factor of log log(1/ε).
Theorem 2.4 ([BCD + 17, DW09]).
Let ε > 0 be sufficiently small, and let n, k, d, t ∈ N. There exists a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} with d ≤ log(n) + 2 log(1/ε) + 2 log(t) + O(1) and k ≤ log(d) + 2 log(1/ε) + t + O(log(t)).
Refined coding bounds
As we mentioned in the technical overview (Section 1.2), we prove our entropy lower bound for non-malleable extractors by deriving codes from extractors and bounding the rate of these codes. To this end, in this section we prove refined bounds on the rate of binary codes with a given minimum distance. Our starting point is the seminal result of McEliece, Rodemich, Rumsey and Welch [MRR + 77]. 1) is some function that tends to zero as n grows to infinity. Observe that in particular, by plugging in δ = 0.5 − ε for sufficiently small ε > 0, and letting n be sufficiently large Theorem 3.1 implies that any family of binary codes with blocklength n and relative distance 1 2 − ε has rate ρ = O(ε 2 log(1/ε)). However, the above does not suffice for our needs, as to prove our main result (Theorem 1) we need a quantitative bound on n. We thus prove the following theorem, which provides the refined bound that we seek. Proof. The proof follows the general approach of Navon and Samorodnitsky [NS09] , who provide a spectral graph theoretic framework to prove upper bounds on the rate of binary codes.
We will need the following definition, which generalizes the notion of a maximal eigenvalue to subsets of the hypercube. Definition 3.3. Let A ∈ {0, 1} 2 n ×2 n be the adjacency matrix of the hypercube graph; that is, A x,y = 1 if and only if x ∈ {0, 1} n and y ∈ {0, 1} n differ in exactly one coordinate. Given a set B ⊆ {0, 1} n , we define
To better understand the definition of λ B , it is convenient to consider the subgraph H B of the hypercube graph {0, 1} n induced by the vertices in B, and observe that λ B is the maximal eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix of H B . Navon and Samorodnitsky [NS09] prove the following result.
Proposition 3.4 ([NS09, Proposition 1.1 ]). Let C ⊆ {0, 1} n be a code with relative distance δ > 0, and let ε > 0. Suppose that for a subset B ⊆ {0, 1} n it holds that λ B ≥ (1 − 2δ + ε)n. Then |C| ≤ |B|/ε.
The foregoing theorem naturally suggest the following proof strategy: to upper bound the rate of a binary code C with relative distance δ = 0.5 − ε, it suffcies to exhibit a (small as possible) set B ⊆ {0, 1} n whose corresponding maximal eigenvalue satisfies λ B ≥ 3εn; note that the smaller B is, the better upper bound we get on the rate of C.
Towards this end, let r ∈ [n] be a parameter to be chosen later, and let B = x ∈ {0, 1} n : |x| ∈ {r, r + 1} .
We lower bound the maximal eigenvalue λ B by showing a particular function f that is supported on B, such that Af,f f,f ≥ 3εn. Specifically, for some a, b ∈ R to be chosen later, we define f :
.
By choosing r to be an integer in the interval Af, f f, f > a 2 r/n · r(n − r) a 2 r + a 2 · (r/n) · (n − r) = √ rn(n − r) 2n − r > 3εn , 2 Note that by the assumption in the theorem we have 1 < ε 2 c n < n. In particular, the interval where the last inequality uses the assumptions that ε < c < 1/20, which implies that r ≤ 10ε 2 c n < n 2 . Therefore, by applying Proposition 3.4 we get that
which concludes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we prove Theorem 1, which we restate here with slightly more specific parameters than those stated above.
Theorem 1 (restated): Let n, k, d, t ∈ N be parameters such that t ≤ 2 d/2 , and let ε ∈ (0, c 0 /2) for c 0 = min{1/2 c , 1/20}, where c > 0 is the constant from Theorem 2.1.
We start, in Section 4.1, with the proof of Theorem 1 for the special case where t = 1 (i.e., for standard non-malleable extractors). Then, in Section 4.2, we provide the full proof for general values of t.
Proof of Theorem 1 for t = 1
Following the outline provided in Section 1.2, we start the proof with the following lemma, showing that any non-malleable extractor induces an error correcting code with good distance. Proof. Let nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor, and let X be an (n, k)-source. That is, X ⊆ {0, 1} n is a collection of K = 2 k vectors, which we denote by X = {x 1 , . . . , x K } ⊆ {0, 1} n . For each seed s ∈ {0, 1} d , let w (s) ∈ {0, 1} K be the K-bit evaluation vector defined as
We claim that the (multi-)set {w (s) : s ∈ {0, 1} d } ⊆ {0, 1} K contains an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1} K with relative distance 0.5 − 2ε and rate
There exists a subset S ⊆ {0, 1} d of size 2 d−1 such that for every two distinct s, s ∈ S it holds that dist(w (s) , w (s ) ) ≥ 0.5 − 2ε.
Proof. Suppose towards contradiction that for every subset S ⊆ {0, 1} d of size at least 2 d−1 there exist distinct seeds s, s ∈ S such that dist(w (s) , w (s ) ) < 0.5 − 2ε. We show below that this contradicts the assumption that nmExt is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor.
Indeed, by the assumption, we can find s 1 , s 1 ∈ {0, 1} d such that dist(w (s 1 ) , w (s 1 ) ) < 0.5 − 2ε. Then, we can remove s 1 , s 1 from {0, 1} d , and apply the assumption again, to obtain s 2 , s 2 ∈ {0, 1} d \ {s 1 , s 1 } such that dist(w (s 2 ) , w (s 2 ) ) < 0.5 − 2ε. By iteratively repeating this argument D/4 times, where D = 2 d , we obtain D/4 pairs of distinct elements (s 1 , s 1 
Let B = {s j , s j : j ∈ [D/4]} ⊆ {0, 1} d denote the set of all such "bad" seeds, and define an adversarial function A : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} d that matches each pair of bad seeds by mapping A(s j ) = s j and A(s j ) = s j for all j ∈ [D/4], and defining A(s) arbitrarily for all other seeds s / ∈ B. Next we prove that nmExt is not a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor by arguing that the distribution of the random variable consisting of the 3-tuple (nmExt(X,
where recall that U m denotes the random variable that is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} m . Indeed, consider the following distinguisher Therefore, by Claim 4.2 there exists a set C = {w (s) : s ∈ S} ⊆ {0, 1} K of size 2 d−1 such that for every x, y ∈ C it holds that dist(x, y) ≥ 0.5 − 2ε, i.e., C is an error correcting code with relative distance 0.5 − 2ε and rate Proof. Let nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} be a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4.1, we set K = 2 k , and let X be an (n, k)-source, which we view as a collection of vectors X = {x 1 , . . . , x K } ⊆ {0, 1} n . For each seed s ∈ {0, 1} d , let w (s) ∈ {0, 1} K be the K-bit evaluation vector, defined as w (s) = nmExt(x i , s) i∈{1,...,K} . Hereafter, all sums involving binary vectors are summations over GF(2). For x ∈ {0, 1} n , we denote by weight(x) the (absolute) Hamming weight of x.
Whereas before, in the proof of Lemma 4.1, we showed that the multi-set of evaluation vectors w (s) : s ∈ {0, 1} d ⊆ {0, 1} K simply contains an error correcting code with good parameters, here we will derive our code by considering all GF(2)-linear combinations of t/2 elements of a carefully selected subset of the evaluation vectors.
Towards that end, the next claim shows that there exists a large subset of seeds such that any linear combination of t + 1 of the evaluation vectors that corresponds to these seeds has large Hamming weight. Proof. Assume towards contradiction that for every subset S ⊆ {0, 1} d of size at least 2 d−1 there are t ≤ t + 1 distinct seeds s 1 . . . , s t ∈ S such that
We show below that this contradicts the assumption that nmExt is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor. By our assumption, there is a subset of seeds S 1 ⊆ {0, 1} d for which there exists I 1 ⊆ S 1 of size |I 1 | = t 1 ≤ t such that weight s∈I 1 w (s) < (0.5 − 2ε)K. We remove I 1 from {0, 1} d , and apply the assumption again to obtain I 2 ⊆ {0, 1} d of size |I 2 | = t 2 ≤ t + 1 such that weight s∈I 2 w (s) < (0.5 − 2ε)K. We then remove I 2 from {0, 1} d \ I 1 , and apply the assumption again with respect to {0, 1} d \ (I 1 ∪ I 2 ). By repeating this argument as long as | ∪ j I j | < 2 d−1 , we obtain R disjoint subsets I 1 , . . . , I R , where the size of each I j is t j ≤ t + 1, such that
for all j ∈ [R]. Analogously to the proof of Lemma 4.1, the set I 1 ∪ . . . ∪ I T consists of the "bad seeds" that correspond to evaluation vectors whose (t + 1)-element linear combinations are of low weight.
To prove that the foregoing collection of "bad seeds" violates the assumption that nmExt is a (k, ε)-t-non-malleable extractor, we exhibit t adversarial functions A 1 , . . . , A t : {0, 1} d → {0, 1} d (with no fixed points) for which there exists a function that distinguishes between the random variables consisting of the (t + 2)-tuples
, U d with confidence ε, where recall that U m denotes the random variable that is uniformly distributed over {0, 1} m .
We define the family {A } ∈[t] in the natural way, by mapping each of the bad seeds to the set of seeds with which its linear combination is a low weight vector. That is, for each j ∈ [R] let I j = {s 1 , . . . , s t j }, where t j ≤ t + 1. Then, for all ∈ [t] we define ≥ (D/2t) t/2 . By the guarantee of Claim 4.4, for every distinct x, y ∈ C it holds that dist(x, y) ≥ 0.5 − 2ε; that is C ⊆ {0, 1} K is an error correcting code with relative distance 0.5 − 2ε, which completes the proof of Lemma 4.3.
We prove Theorem 1 by applying the bound from Theorem 3.2 to the code obtained in Lemma 4.3, analogously to the way we proved the theorem for the restricted case of t = 1 before.
Proof of Theorem 1 (general case). Since every t-non-malleable extractor is, in particular, a strong seeded extractor, then by Theorem 2.1 it holds that the seed length is d > log(n−k)+2 log(1/ε)−c, as required. Furthermore, Theorem 2.1 also implies that k ≥ 2 log(1/ε) − c.
By Lemma 4.3, if nmExt : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} d → {0, 1} is a (k, ε)-non-malleable extractor, then there exists an error correcting code C ⊆ {0, 1} 2 k with relative distance 0.5 − 2ε such that |C| ≥ (2 d−1 /t) t/2 .
We wish to apply Theorem 3.2 to the code C. Recall that by the assumption it holds that ε < c 0 and c 0 < 1/2 c , and observe that according to the bound on k given by Theorem 2.1, we have that 2 k ≥ , and by the assumption that log(t) < d/2 we get that
This implies that k ≥ log(d) + log(t) + 2 log(1/ε) − log log(1/ε) − O(1), as required.
